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February 1967] Recent Developments 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-State Action: Significant 




From 1959 through 1963, the California legislature enacted a 
series of statutes which prohibited racial discrimination in the sale 
or rental of housing. Most important among these were the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act, 1 which proscribed racial discrimination by "busi-
ness establishments of every kind,''2 and the Rumford Fair Housing 
Act,3 which prohibited such conduct by anyone in the sale or rental 
of residential housing containing more than four units.4 Adverse 
public reaction to these statutes resulted in an amendment to the 
California constitution15 by means of an initiative measure in the 
general election of 1964.6 This amendment, popularly known as Prop-
osition 14, effectively nullified the Unruh and Rumford Acts to the 
extent that they applied to housing since it prohibited any state in-
terference with an individual's exercise of "his absolute discretion" 
in the sale or rental of his real property.7 The constitutionality of 
• 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), cert. granted, 87 Sup. Ct. 500 (1966) (No. 
488) [hereinafter referred to as principal case]. 
I, CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 51-52 (Supp. 1966). 
2, This includes real estate brokers and all businesses selling or leasing residential 
housing. See Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321, 20 Cal, Rptr. 617 (1962); 
Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr, 609 (1962). 
8, CAL. HEALTH &: SAFETY CODE §§ 85700-44 (Supp. 1965). 
4. Id.§ 85720. 
5. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 26. 
6. The measure passed by a vote of 4,526,460 to 2,895,747. 
7, The amendment provides in part: "Neither the State nor any subdivision or 
agency thereof shall deny, limit, or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any 
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the amendment was tested in the principal case when the defendant, 
contending that his conduct was justified under the amendment, re-
fused to rent a vacant apartment to the plaintiffs, a Negro couple, 
solely because of their race. The trial court sustained the defendant's 
argument and granted a motion for summary judgment. On appeal 
to the California Supreme Court, held, reversed, two justices dissent-
ing. The initiative measure constituted state action which denied the 
plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution. 
It has long been established that the safeguards of the fourteenth 
amendment apply only to action by the state and that an abridgement 
of one individual's civil rights by another does not violate the equal 
protection clause.8 However, in recent years the line separating pri-
vate and state action has become blurred. In many instances where 
the act which constituted discrimination was committed by an in-
dividual, or a group of individuals, the Supreme Court has neverthe-
less applied the fourteenth amendment because the state had taken 
some action which was connected to the discrimination.9 The type or 
degree of connection that the state action must have to the private 
conduct has never been clearly defined.10 Indeed, the Court has con-
sidered the fashioning of any precise formula "for recognition of 
state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause" to be an 
"impossible task" and has decided each case by "sifting facts and 
weighing circumstances."11 In the principal case, it is obvious that 
there was action by the state when the people enacted the initiative 
measure,12 and it is equally clear that the defendant's refusal to rent 
was an act of discrimination which would have been a violation of 
the fourteenth amendment had the act been committed directly by 
the state.13 Moreover, some connection existed between these two 
acts since prior to the passage of the amendment the Unruh Act 
person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease, or rent any part or all of his real prop-
erty, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in 
his absolute discretion, chooses." 
8. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883). 
9. See, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 
130 (1964); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948). 
10. See, e.g., Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957); Lewis, The Meaning of State Ac• 
tion, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); St. Antoine, Color Blindness but Not Myopia: A 
New Look at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 
MICH. L. REV. 993 (1961); Van Alstyne &: Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961). 
11. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
12. A state can act through the electorate as well as the legislature. See Lucas v. 
Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.~. 713, 737 (1964); State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
13. "It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from 
discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, 
enjoy, own and dispose of property." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948). 
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would have rendered unlawful such discrimination.14 The question 
remains whether this connection was sufficient to "bring the matter 
within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment."15 The court 
concluded that it was, because, in its view, the state will be held re-
sponsible for discriminatory conduct whenever the state is "signifi-
cantly involved" in that conduct.16 
In support of its position, the court relied on Shelley v. Kraemer11 
where parties to a restrictive covenant obtained from a state court 
an order enjoining a sale of real property to a Negro in violation of 
their agreement. The Supreme Court held that, by enforcing the 
covenant, the state became a participant in the allegedly private dis-
crimination since the court's active intervention made it possible to 
bar the Negroes' occupancy of the property.18 Conceptually, the 
situation in the principal case is analogous, for it can be argued that 
it was the action of the state in passing Proposition 14 that made the 
defendant's discrimination possible.19 However, as the dissenting 
justice pointed out, the seller in Shelley was willing to convey his 
property to the Negro, and therefore enforcement of the covenant 
did not merely make discrimination possible, but rather compelled 
it.20 This factual distinction is especially important in light of the 
14. From the facts of the case it is not clear whether there would also have been a 
violation of the Rumford Act. The suit was originally instituted in May 1963, prior to 
passage of either the Rumford Act or Proposition 14. 
15. Principal case at 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886. 
16. Id. at 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888. The phrase was derived from Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), where the Supreme Court stated that 
"private conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection 
Clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been 
found to have become involved in it." 
17. 334 U.S. l (1948). 
18. Id. at 19: "It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, ••• 
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint." 
19. The court's interpretation of Shelley was unclear, but it seemed to indicate that 
it believed Shelley stood for the proposition that "but for" the action of the state the 
discrimination could not have occurred. Clearly, this is one possible view of the Su-
preme Court's holding. See Manning, State Responsibility Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: An Adherence to Tradition, 27 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 201, 211-14 (1958). However, 
if the state action requirement is to be a meaningful limitation on the scope of the 
fourteenth amendment, it is probably too broad a view. Today, it is difficult to postu-
late a situation, especially one relating to a private property owner, in which the state 
is not involved to some degree; whether it be through granting a building license or 
providing services such as water, the state is involved in private activity to the extent 
that it makes it possible. It could therefore be argued that since the building and oc-
cupancy of a home would not be possible but for the state, neither would the discrimi-
nation be possible. See Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Radal Dis-
crimination in "Private" Housing, 52 CALIF. L. R.Ev. l, 12 (1964). In addition, the 
Supreme Court would probably decline to adopt this broad a view. See Bell v. Mary-
land, 378 U.S. 226, 333 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). 
20. Principal case at 842, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (White, J., dissenting); see Horowitz, 
supra note 19, at 3; Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to 
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev. l (1959). It has also been pointed out that judi-
cial enforcement in Shelley would deny the willing seller and willing buyer their fed-
erally guaranteed rights to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey" property 
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Supreme Court's apparent refusal to give effect to the potential 
breadth of its holding in Shelley.21 Indeed, a restrictive view of the 
case may be necessary since the Court has not relied upon Shelley 
even in its subsequent expansions of the concept of state enforcement 
of private discriminations.22 
Further examples of "significant involvement" cited by the court 
in the principal case were Marsh v. Alabama,23 and the series of 
"white primary cases."24 In the former, a private company owned 
a town and attempted to restrict the freedom of speech within its 
limits, while in the latter private groups attempted to exclude Ne-
groes from voting through their control of the party's primary 
elections.25 The majority in the principal case concluded that in both 
of these situations, the Supreme Court had found the requisite state 
action in the fact that the state had "permitted" practices that would 
have been unconstitutional had it been running the town or control-
ling the elections.26 By analogy, California also "permitted" an act of 
racial discrimination when it nullified the Unruh and Rumford Acts 
by enactment of the amendment. However, once again the analogy 
of the court is an oversimplification. In the cases cited, the Supreme 
Court's decisions were based on the proposition that private groups 
performing functions which are governmental in nature will be 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 328-32 (1964) (Black, 
J., dissenting). It would seem that where an unwilling seller is a party to the litigation, 
as in the principal case, judicial action under these circumstances would also impinge 
on the seller's right to "sell" or "convey." 
21. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, llO U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
473, 474 (1962); Comment, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 473, 477 (1965). 
22. In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), the Supreme Court indicated that 
enforcement by the state of a private policy of racial segregation would be a violation 
of the fourteenth amendment. See discussion in text accompanying note 52 infra. This 
would appear to be an expansion of the principle announced in Shelley, and yet the 
Court failed to cite its decision in that case. 
23. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
24. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949); Rice 
v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947). 
25. The court also referred to the recent decision of Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 
(1966). This case was concerned with an attempt by the city of Macon, Georgia, to 
abdicate its function as trustee of a public park in favor of private parties, so that a 
policy of segregation of the facility could be maintained. The Court concluded that the 
"public character of the park requires that it be treated as a public institution subject 
to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment •••. " Id. at 302. However, the prop-
erty involved in the principal case was private and therefore in a different posture in 
relation to the fourteenth amendment. See note 28 infra. 
26. Principal case at 832, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888. Support for this view is contained in 
statements like: "In our view the circumstance that the property rights • . • were held 
by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation 
to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties • • • ." 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
"This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a 
State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organiza-
tion to practice racial discrimination •••. " Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944). 
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subject to the same constitutional limitations as is the state.27 Clearly, 
the defendant in the principal case was not acting in a capacity re-
lated to any traditionally governmental function but rather his act 
was of a purely private character. In addition, the Court in Marsh 
relied on the idea that a property owner's rights may be circum-
scribed by the constitutional rights of others when he opens his 
property to the public,28 while in the "white primary cases," the 
basis of the decisions was the fifteenth rather than the fourteenth 
amendment and it may be argued that the state action requirement 
is subject to a different interpretation where voting rights are in-
volved.29 
In its discussion of "significant involvement," the court in the 
principal case went on to say that "the color of state action" may 
attach when the state merely encourages the discriminatory con-
duct. 30 Support for this proposition was found in several related 
cases. In Barrows v. ]ackson,81 a case involving a factual situation 
similar to that in Shelley, the Supreme Court alluded to the "encour-
agement" of discrimination that would be provided by judicial en-
forcement of the restrictive covenants.32 The same idea was present in 
Anderson v. Martin33 where the Court took judicial notice of the 
"inducement" to racial prejudice provided by a statute requiring 
the racial labeling of candidates on the ballot.34 Also, a plan for in-
tegrating schools which permitted a student to transfer to a school 
in which the majority of the students were members of his race was 
declared invalid under the equal protection clause because it "pro-
moted" continued segregation of the races.35 In the principal case, 
the court inferred that encouragement of racial discrimination in the 
sale or rental of housing was evidenced by the fact that the amend-
ment made lawful conduct which had been prohibited. However, 
it is questionable whether such encouragement, if any existed, was 
comparable to that present in the cases cited.86 In Barrows, it seems 
27. See Evans v. Newton, 882 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). 
28, "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it." 326 U.S. at 506. 
29. See Note, The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, 74 YALE LJ. 1448 (1965); Lewis, supra note 10, at 1094. 
80, Principal case at 882, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 888. 
81, 846 U.S. 249 (1958). The only difference is that in Shelley the plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin the sale, while in Barrows the suit was for damages. 
82, Id. at 254. 
88, 875 U.S. 399 (1964). 
84, "The vice lies not in the resulting injury but in the placing of the power of the 
State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice , ••• " Id. at 402. 
85. Goss v. Board of Educ., 878 U.S. 688, 688 (1963). 
56. The court also relied on Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 158 (1964); McCabe v. 
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 285 U.S. 151 (1914); and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 865 U.S. 715 (1961), to support its conclusion that state encouragement of dis-
crimination is the equivalent of "significant involvement." It is questionable whether 
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clear that substantially more than mere encouragement was involved, 
for the opinion alluded to the fact that the court's action would 
actually "coerce" the seller into discriminatory conduct.37 Similarly, 
the racial classification in Anderson was, to be sure, an inducement 
to racial prejudice, but equally important was the fact that the at-
tempt to inject bigotry into the elective process served no legitimate 
governmental interest.38 Finally, the transfer plan was an obvious 
attempt to prolong segregation in the schools and was also not re-
lated to any proper purpose. On the other hand, the principal case 
clearly involved competing interests:39 a minority group's quest for 
adequate housing versus an individual's right to dispose of his prop-
erty as he pleased. It is thus conceivable that the amendment had 
a legitimate purpose and was no more than a "declaration of neu-
trality in a relatively narrow area of human conduct.''4° Further-
more, the state action which was present in the above-mentioned 
cases could be equated with a state policy favoring bigotry whereas 
it is difficult to equate Proposition 14 with a state policy favoring 
racial prejudice in light of the anti-discrimination legislation left 
undisturbed by its enactment.41 
From the above discussion it is possible to conclude that there 
was substantially less state involvement in the principal case than in 
those relied upon by the court and that therefore the court's holding 
extends previous concepts of what constitutes a sufficient connection 
between private and state action. Of equal, if not greater, interest 
are the implications of the decision with respect to the enactment 
of anti-discrimination statutes by state legislatures. In the principal 
case, the court concluded that it was the nullification of the Unruh 
and Rumford Acts, statutes which had extended an individual's 
right to buy property from another free of discrimination, which 
constituted significant involvement by the state in the discriminatory 
conduct of the defendant. The decision therefore seems to imply 
any of these cases do support the court's argument, for the idea of state inducement of 
racial prejudice was not the basis of any of these decisions. Moreover, in Robinson and 
Burton the property involved was a restaurant, and in McCabe it was a common car-
rier. All of these are public facilities and consequently are in a different posture in 
relation to the fourteenth amendment than purely private property. See note 28 supra. 
37. "If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to carry out her cov-
enant, she is coerced to continue to use her property in a discriminatory manner ••• ," 
Banows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953). 
38. "We see no relevance in the State's pointing up the race of the candidate as 
bearing upon his qualification for office. Indeed, this factor in itself 'underscores the 
purely racial character and purpose' of the statute." 375 U.S. 399, 403 (1964). 
39. Principal case at 839, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (White, J., dissenting). 
40. Id. at 838, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 894. 
41. These include CAL. PEN. CODE § 365, relating to innkeepers and common caniers; 
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-32, concerning employment practices; and CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 51-54 (Supp. 1966), containing the portions of the Unruh Act which were not nulli-
fied by the amendment. 
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that once a state commits itself to a policy of anti-discrimination and 
implements that policy by enacting legislation, such legislation can-
not be repealed without violating the equal protection clause, for 
to do so would constitute encouragement of the denial of a previ-
ously extended right. Such a conclusion raises interesting questions 
as to the effect that this will have on a legislature's willingness to pass 
such legislation or its ability to repeal measures that have proved to 
be ineffective or unenforceable.42 
The decision further suggests that a legislature may not even 
have a choice as to whether it will enact the unrepealable anti-dis-
crimination legislation-it may have a duty to do so.43 It can be 
argued that failure to enact measures that restrict private discrimina-
tion makes such discrimination possible, if indeed it is not an in-
ducement to such conduct. Therefore, one could conclude that the 
state's inaction would sufficiently involve the state in the discrimina-
tion so as to constitute a denial of equal protection. Since the court 
stated that the involvement must consist of action on the part of the 
state,44 one could argue that inaction would not be sufficient. How-
ever, there are a series of decisions indicating that where there is a 
duty to act, state inaction is the equivalent of state action.45 Addi-
tional support for this proposition may be provided by the govern-
ment function cases where arguably the inaction of the state in per-
mitting private parties to discriminate constituted the requisite state 
involvement.46 It should be obvious that if these implications are 
42. This conclusion also raises questions concerning the constitutionality of the re-
peal of Reconstruction statutes passed to restrict racial prejudice in states like :Mississippi. 
Though it can be argued that any encouragement they may have given to private dis-
criminations has long since ceased, in light of the California court's treatment of this 
element of state action, such a contention may not be decisive. See Henkin, supra note 
21, at 483 n.20. 
43. It is unclear what the effect of a breach of such a duty would be. It may mean 
that anyone who was the subject of a private discrimination which the state should have 
prevented would be able to bring suit to compel the enactment of an anti-discrimina-
tion statute. This would be somewhat analogous to the procedure followed in some 
states with regard to reapportionment. See Scholle v. Secretary of State, 367 Mich. 176, 
ll6 N.W.2d 350 (1962). 
Another possibility would be to allow a suit directly against the perpetrator of the 
discrimination. In such an action the court would have no choice but to grant some 
form of relief, since imposing a duty to pass anti-discrimination legislation is the equiv-
alent of compelling the state to prohibit private acts of discrimination that would be 
subject to such legislation. Use of this approach would be dependent on an expansive 
interpretation of Shelley to include all judicial enforcement of private discriminations, 
rather than only those which result from solicitation of the court by the party attempt-
ing to discriminate. See note 53 infra. 
44. Principal case at 830, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886. 
45. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 310-ll (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lynch 
v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); Catlette v. 
United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). For a discussion of these and other cases 
relating to the same proposition, see Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 303 (1959). 
46. See note 26 supra. 
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unavoidable, the line separating state action and private action has 
been further blurred and probably obliterated.47 Conceivably, the 
state could be held responsible for practically every private discrimi-
nation that infringed upon a right protected by the fourteenth 
amendment, since such discrimination would not have been lawful 
but for the state's failure to act. 
It is interesting to note that in the subsequent case of Hill v. 
Miller,48 the California court attempted to dispel the notion that 
the decision in the principal case contained such implications. In 
Hill, the defendant purchased a single unit dwelling and attempted 
to evict the Negro tenant, admittedly because of his race. The Negro 
brought suit, but it was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 
The California Supreme Court, affirming, declared that the four-
teenth amendment does not impose an affirmative duty on the state 
to prohibit private discriminations of the nature alleged.49 Conse-
quently, the court concluded, the state was in no way responsible 
for the discriminatory conduct. The decision, however, presents sev-
eral problems of a practical nature. If the tenant refrains from bring-
ing suit and instead chooses to remain on the premises, the landlord 
will be without a remedy, for if the landlord were to bring suit for 
unlawful detainer and were to prevail, enforcement of the order 
would constitute state action denying equal protection of the laws. 
This result is dictated by Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson/•0 
in which the California Supreme Court expanded Shelley v. Krae-
mer51 so as to include an "unwilling seller." Admittedly, in the hy-
pothetical the party attempting to discriminate sought the aid of the 
court whereas in the actual case the subject of the discriminatory 
conduct initiated the litigation. However, this may be a distinction 
without a difference, for it would seem that, regardless of who initi-
ates the litigation, the important factor should be that the courts are 
being used to enforce a policy of racial discrimination. 52 Indeed, in 
47. Some commentators have concluded that the state action requirement has, for 
all practical purposes, already been read out of the fourteenth amendment. Silard, 
A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal Protection 
Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 
TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1963). But see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966), where 
the Supreme Court, at least formally, reaffirmed the requirement. 
48. 415 P.2d 33, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966). 
49. Id. at 34, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 690. 
50. 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). 
51. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see discussion in text accompanying note 17 supra. 
52. Although this was, in fact, the distinction relied on by the California court, 415 
P.2d at 34, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 690, support for the textual conclusion can be found in the 
case of Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 136 (1964). There the court declared that any 
time "the State undertakes an obligation to enforce a private policy of racial segregation, 
the State is charged with racial discrimination •.•• " At least one commentator has 
argued that the broad implications of the Court's holding in Griffin must be limited 
for "certain private rights outweigh the presence and effect of state action." Comment, 
50 CORNELL L.Q. 473, 484 (1965). As an example, he suggested the case where the state 
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the principal case the court casts doubt on the idea that only offensive 
use of the courts is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, for it 
intimated that defensive use may also constitute state enforcement 
of discrimination. 53 
The court in the principal case was obviously conscious of the 
fact that affirmation of the lower court's decision and the consequent 
nullification of previous anti-discrimination legislation would have 
jeopardized the entire Civil Rights movement in the area of fair 
housing. However, no other court has held that, absent evidence of 
state compulsion of or a state policy favoring discriminatory conduct, 
the repeal of a statute, which repeal merely makes private discrimi-
nation possible and only to that extent encourages it, "significantly 
involves" the state in that conduct.54 Such a decision would signal 
the end of the state action requirement as a meaningful limitation 
on the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, it would appear 
that the principal case is "more the product of human impulses . . . 
than of solid constitutional thinking."55 
aids in the enforcement of the discrimination of a private property owner. However, 
the holding in Abstract may negate the idea that courts will engage in a balancing 
process to determine which forms of state enforcement of private discriminations are 
prohibited. 
53. Though in its discussion of Shelley the court recognized the distinction between 
one who "solicits and obtains the aid of the court in the accomplishment of that dis-
crimination" and one who is in court "because [he has] been summoned there by those 
against whom [he seeks] to discriminate," it seemed to minimize this difference, thereby 
implying that any judicial enforcement of a private discrimination may be unconstitu-
tional state action. Principal case at 831, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 887. The implications of such 
a holding would be far-reaching. If defensive use of the courts does come within the 
ambit of Shelley, the judiciary would be forced to grant some sort of relief in any suit 
initiated by one who was the subject of a discrimination or face the prospect of being 
reversed on the basis of enforcement of that discrimination. 
54. As seen earlier, the question of "significant involvement" is one of degree and 
in each decision cited the connection of the state to the discrimination had been more 
substantial. However, it is somewhat incongruous that a state should be able effectively 
to nullify all fair housing legislation and thereby enhance the probabilities for 
prolonging the segregation of the races. In this connection, it would seem that the 
unique facts of the principal case suggest the need for an alternative approach to the 
sifting of facts and weighing of circumstances to find whether the state is significantly 
involved in a private discrimination. See text accompanying note 11 supra. It has been 
suggested that the question should be "whether because of the character of state in-
volvement ••• there has been a denial for which the state should be held responsible." 
Henkin, supra note 21, at 481. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, this would shift the emphasis 
to policy considerations, but the inadequacies of the decision in the principal case in-
dicate that such a change may be desirable. 
55. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 315 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
